Migration and Remittances in South Africa : the role of political factors. by Kuhn, Mélanie et al.
1 
 











(Work in progress) 
 
Abstract: This paper looks at the determinants of international remittances in the case of 
South-South  migrations.  Using  micro-economic  data  from  a  survey  conducted  in  2006, 
analysis  was  carried  out  on  639  African  migrants  residing  in  Johannesburg.  Besides  the 
traditional variables (income, household’s size in the host country, age, sex, education…), 
political variables (regime change in the host country and conditions in the country of origin 
before  the  migration  including  war,  and  conflict)  are  used  in  the  analysis.  The  results 
highlight the importance of these political variables as determinants of migrants’ probability 
to remit. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa impacts positively and significantly 
the probability of remitting money to the home country while the fact of having fled one’s 
country  of  origin  because  of  violence  or  conflict  has  the  opposite  effect.  However,  the 
political change in the host country has no influence on the amounts transferred. Once the 
decision  to  remit  is  taken,  traditional  variables  have  more  of  an  explanatory  power  in 
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1.  Introduction. 
Because  of  their  size,  international  remittances  attract  more  and  more  the  attention  of 
researchers, international organizations and political decision-makers
4. Despite a drop in 2009 
because of the economic crisis, international remittances increased again in 2010 to reach 440 
billion  dollars  (Mohapatra,  Ratha  and  Silwal,  2010).  The  developing  countries  are  the 
principal recipients: 73.9% of these private financial flows were sent in their favor in 2010, 
that is to say 325 billion dollars
5. International remittances thus constitute “an essential source 
of incomes for many poor countries” (Ratha, 2009a)
. They are the second source of external 
financing for the developing countries after the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and far 
ahead of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
6.  
 
While many theoretical and empirical research  works try to study, understand and explain 
these financial flows, the analytical framework is often limited to remittances from developed 
to developing countries. On the other hand,  few studies deal with South-South remittances, 
i.e. remittances between developing countries. The lack of data and their low reliability in 
developing countries partly explains these gaps. However, the study of remittances between 
developing countries (30% of the whole of international remittances in 2005) is important for 
at least three reasons. First, there are many  migrants in developing countries
7. South-South 
migrations  are  higher  than  South -North  migrations:  over  43%  of  the  migrants  from 
developing countries are believed to be residing in other developing countries (World B ank, 
2010).  Like those who reside in developed countries, migrants in developing countries remit 
part of their income to their families in their country of origin. An analysis of their behaviour 
is, in this regard, interesting as well as necessary to bett er understand what determines 
remittance  flows.  Secondly,  some  of  the  migrants  within  the  developing  countries  are 
different from the migrants who migrate towards the industrialized countries by the character 
generally forced of their displacements. The number of people forced to migrate because of 
armed conflicts or persecutions at the end of 2008 reached 42 million people (0.63% of the 
world population and around 21% of the population of international migrants). Among them 
80% are in a developing country (33.6 million of people), 36.2% are refugees (15.2 million), 
1.9% are asylum seekers (827 000) and 61.9% are internal displaced persons (IDPs) (26 
million)  (UNHCR,  2009).   While  the  international  migrants  who  migrate  towards  the 
industrialized countries are mainly individuals who move by choice, in particular in order to 
benefit from better economic opportunities in the host country.  Many of the migrants moving 
within the developing countries do it under the constraint in order to flee armed conflicts, 
political instability, persecutions or natural disasters. In the first case the migration can be 
                                                           
4 Remittances are defined by the World Bank as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees 
and migrant transfers. 
5 In reality theses figures must be higher because of informal remittances that are not taken into account in the 
official statistics. 
6 FDI and ODA towards developing countries respectively reached 359  and 120 billion dollars in 2009 (World 
Bank, 2010).  
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described  as  “volunteer” or “chosen”  while the  second case  can be qualified of “forced” 
migration. The difference in nature of the migration can then lead to different behaviors as 
regards remittances. This field is to date little exploited. Thirdly, these research efforts are 
justified by the fact that remittances are not without consequences on the economy and the 
welfare of the population on the receiving end.  
 
As richest country of the continent South Africa attracts many migrants in search of economic 
opportunities. It is also a destination of choice for migrants seeking economic or political 
safety.  Before  reaching  the  democracy  South  Africa  knew  a  period  of  strong  racial 
segregation, the apartheid, with regard to the black and migrant populations (1946-1991). 
From  the  middle  of  the  20
th  century  political  changes  resulted  in  modifications  of  the 
migratory policy and composition of flows of migrants. Whereas the racist criteria dominated 
the migratory policy under apartheid, today it aims at satisfying the qualified labor needs of 
the country. As a consequence of the evolution of the migratory policy, flows of migrants 
changed to the detriment of white populations and in favor of  black and Asian populations, 
refugees  and  illegal  migrants  (Wa  Kabwe-Segatti  and  Landau  (2008),  Kok,  Gelderblom, 
Oucho, J.O. and Van Zyl (2006), Maharaj (2004)). Attracting the migrants of the continent for 
already several decades and even more since the first democratic elections in 1994
8, South 
Africa is an interesting country to study the behavior of the migrants as regards South-South 
remittances. Moreover this country gives us the opportunity of studying the existence or not 
of  differences  in  behavior  as regards  remittances  according to  the  status  of  the  migrant 
(“economic” versus “forced”) and according to the political regime in the host country.  
 
With data on 639 African migrants residing in Johannesburg this paper aims to answer the 
following questions. Which are the determinants of international remittances in the case of 
migrations between Sub-Saharan African countries and South Africa? Does the fact of having 
fled the country of origin under constraint impact the behavior of the migrants? Lastly does 
the nature of the political regime in the host country affect the behavior of the migrants as 
regards remittances?  
 
Section  2  presents  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  concerning  the  determinants  of 
remittances  by  distinguishing  the  differences  in  behavior  according  to  the  status  of  the 
migrants, forced or volunteer. Section 3 describes the survey used to inform the characteristics 
of the migrants and the transfers realized. Section 4 proposes an estimate of the determinants 
of  the  probability  of  transferring  and  transferred  amounts.  The  role  of  the  political  and 
historical  variables  is  identified  independently  of  the  traditional  variables  influencing  the 
behavior of the migrants as regards remittances. Lastly section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                           
8 « It is true that despite the numerous problems that face the majority of Blacks in South Africa, for Africans 
from other parts of the continent, the country is perceived as being the land of increased economic opportunities 
and hope, especially after the 1994 elections » (Maharaj, 2004).  4 
 
2.  Migrations and Remittances in a South-South context: the lessons of the economic 
literature.  
 
Well documented the literature relating to remittances of “economic” migrants is rich and 
covers a relatively broad field. On the contrary few studies deal with remittances in the case 
of  “forced”  migration  (Fagen  (2006),  Lindley  (2007b),  Van  Hear,  Brubaker  and  Bessa 
(2009)). And to date we don’t know any study which analyzes the impact of political change 
in the host country on remittances.  
 
According  to  the  classical  theory  and  the  New  Economics  of  Labor  Migration  (NELM) 
migration  and  remittances  are  a  desired  strategy  of  maximization  or  diversification  of 
incomes. However in the typical case of forced migrations the migrants mainly leave their 
country to save their life and to find more safety elsewhere. But nothing prevents them to 
become thereafter economic migrants and to remit. It is what Lindley (2008) calls the “post-
hoc strategy”. The latter is made possible by the fact that even if individuals are forced to 
leave their country of origin, they generally have more choice with regard to the host country. 
The choice can be motivated by  economic, social and/or political considerations
9. Forced 
migration can thus be mixed (combination of constraint and choice) (Van Hear and Al, 2009). 
Consequently it is very difficult to distinguish between forced and volunteer migrants.  
 
Taking into account  these  difficulties  of  differentiation  but  also  the  potential  similarities 
between the behavior of the economic migrants and the refugees, the motivations to remit 
highlighted by the literature on labor migrations seem to apply to the typical case of  “forced” 
migrations.  However  these  motivations  can’t  be  applied  without  taking  into  account  the 
specificity  and  the  complexity  of  the  context  in  which  these  displacements  take  place. 
Specific conditions of reception in the host country and the unstable and uncertain situation in 
the country of origin are likely to affect the behavior of the migrants as regards remittances.  
 
According  to  the  classical  theory  and  the  NELM  remittances  would  be  explained  by  the 
altruism of the migrant (pure or tempered), by his/her self interest (exchange, investment, 
inheritance), by the will of the family to insure itself against risks (in particular the risk of 
income), by the existence of an informal contract between the migrant and his/her family 
(refunding of a loan) or by a combination of these motivations
10. 
 
The assumption of pure altruism postulates that the migrant sends money to his family in 
order to help it without expecting counterpart in return. However the altruism is seldom the 
single reason for the transfer. It is what Lucas and Stark (1985) call the “tempered altruism”. 
                                                           
9 A study conducted by Lindley in the United Kingdom (2007a) establishes that during the crisis which affected 
Somalia at the end of the Eighties and in the middle of the Nineties, many movements of population resulted in 
priority from the will of the migrants to escape violence and insecurity. The possibilities of carrying out money 
transfers did not enter in a decisive way in the decision to migrate. However many of these refugees finally sent 
money to their family. 
10 See Docquier and Rapoport (2005) and Hagen-Zanker and Siegel (2007) for a detailed review of literature of 
the motivations to remit 5 
 
The transfers can thus rise at the same time from the altruism of the migrant but also of his 
personal interest. The idea is that the migrant remits in order to buy services to his family, to 
invest in his country of origin or in order to make safe an inheritance
11.  
Another reason highlighted by the literature is the existence of a more or less implicit contract 
between the migrant and his family. It is for example the case of remittances intended to 
refund  a  loan  contracted  in order to  finance  the  migration.  Another example of implicit 
arrangement is the idea according to which the parents invest in the education of their child 
(the future migrant) in the hope of receiving remittances in the future. Remittances would thus 
constitute the refunding of a past investment in the human capital of the migrant. 
  
Lastly remittances could be explained by the will of the family to insure itself against risks 
(Gubert (2002), Kaufman and Lindauer (1986), Sana and Massey (2005), Lucas and Stark 
(1985),  Niimi,  Thai  Pham  and  Reilly  (2008)).  In  the presence  of   imperfect  credit  and 
insurance markets in the countries of origin, the families can decide to send abroad some of 
their  members  with  the  aim  of receiving  transfers of funds  in the event of   negative  and 
unexpected shock of income (disease or drought for example). This reason seems particularly 
adapted to the case of the “forced” migrations. As Lindley (2008) underlines it a conflict or a 
natural disaster constitute an event causing a need for insurance:  
 
“Migration and remitting may well be seen as form of insurance for people 
living in crisis-ridden settings. Conflict is in itself an insurance event – a 
time  of  trouble  –  when  families  pull  together.  Over  the  course  of  a 
protracted insecurity in the country of origin, conflict-induced migrants may 
respond to particular crises with (extra) assistance. ” 
Thus the  climate of insecurity in the  country  of  origin can  lead  the  refugees to  remit  to 
minimize or compensate the loss of means of subsistence of its family. A study conducted in 
Somalia shows that money transfers of the refugees constitute an important mechanism of 
assistance to face the risk of income and that they are answers to crises undergone by the 
family (Lindley, 2007a).  
 
The political regime in the host country can also affect the transfers of the migrants. Its impact 
is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand structural barriers can restrict the possibilities of 
access of the refugees to the job market, to education or to the social services (Lindley (2008), 
Riak Akuei (2005)). Or as for the economic migrants the income constitutes a key factor in 
the realization of remittances.  Deprived of income refugees are limited in their capacity of 
transferring. The political regime in the host country can thus have a negative effect on the 
probability and the amounts of the transfers of the “forced” migrants. This negative effect is 
also possible if the policy in the host country allows family gatherings and thus reducing the 
needs of the transfer. On the other hand and taking into account their particular status, it can 
be easier for the refugees - compared to economic migrants - to reach official support and to 
profit  from  a  particular  help  to  find  work.  Their  capacities  and  thus  their  probability  to 
                                                           
11 See Brown (1994, 1997), Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998), Hoddinott (1994) or Secondi (1997).  6 
 
transfer are then reinforced. In the typical case of South Africa the question of the impact of 
the  political  regime  on  remittances  remains  open.  We  can  think  that  the  political  and 
economic evolutions of the country (end of apartheid, ratification of the Convention of the 
United  Nations  relating  to  the  Refugees,  reopening  of  the  country  on  outside,  will  to 
contribute to the development of the African continent, progressive opening of the permanent 
residence to foreign workers, law favorable to the refugees, etc) are likely to support the 
remittances  of  the  migrants.  But  the  increasing  stigmatization  of  the  foreigner,  the 
development of xenophobe feelings and fear of the local population towards the migrants, the 
interventions of the police as well as the infringements of the human rights are extremely 
likely to negatively impact the transfers of funds of the economic and “forced” migrants.  
 
A last factor that can impact differently the behavior of the economic migrants and refugees is 
uncertainty of return in the country of origin. The refugees are often unable to say when the 
conflicts or the political instability in their country of origin will end. According to Lindley 
(2008) this uncertainty can influence money transfers in two different ways. It can result in 
continuous  transfers  because  of  the  difficult  situation  prevailing  in  the  country  of  origin 
(altruistic or insurance reason)
12. But it can also result in limited remittances as the refugees 
do not foresee any future positive prospects in their country.  
 
In order to answer the questions raised in the introduction and in the literature, in particular 
with regard to the impact of political variables on remittances, an original database is used. It 
is presented in the following section. 
 
3.  Description of the MNAC survey.  
 
In  order  to  study  the  determinants  of  remittances  in  the  case  of  migrations  between 
developing countries, an original microeconomic database is used. Entitled “Migration and 
the New African City: Citizenship, Transi, and Transnationalism » (MNAC), this survey was 
conducted in 2006 by the University of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), in association with 
the  French  Institute  of  South  Africa  (IFAS)  and  the  Boston  Tufts  University
13.  Never 
exploited from an economic point of view, this survey is particularly interesting for the study 
of remittances.  
 
Objective  and    subjective  information  is  documented  through  a  questionnaire   (i)  the 
demographic profile of the migrant (age, sex, education, marital status, country of origin...); 
(ii) the conditions prevailing in the country of origin before the migration (reason of the 
migration, networks...); (iii) living conditions of the migrant during the migration like once 
arrived in South Africa (transport used, duration of stay, potential employment, expenses and 
incomes, amount and frequency of remittances, help received on arriv al in South Africa...); 
(iv)  a  series  of  subjective  variables  such  as  migrants’  perceptions  about  the  country’s 
                                                           
12 Lindley (2007a) finds that the recipients interviewed perceive the same or higher amounts since they have 
received remittances. 
13 More specifically, the survey was conducted in South Africa between the 23
rd of January and the 22
nd of June.  7 
 
institutions, the political environment and their insertion in South Africa. Future expectations 
are also documented (deciding to stay or not permanently in the host country for instance).  
 
3.1. Characteristics of the migrants. 
 
Among the 847 migrants of the initial sample, 77.4% are international migrants (that is to say 
656 migrants) and. 22.6% are South-African internal migrants. As the purpose of the paper is 
to study the determinants of international remittances, South-African migrants were excluded 
from the sample
14. Thus the sample we use consists of 639 international migrants. Among 
them 252 come from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (i.e.  39.4% of the sample), 
202 come from Mozambique (31.6%) and 185 come from Somalia (29%) (Table 1). The 
majority of them say they are refugees or asylum seeker (62.6%). But only 48% of them have 
the official status of refugees.  
This  sample  is not  representative  of  the  migrant  population  present  in  South Africa.  In 
addition to the problems relating to the under-representativeness of the migrants in the official 
census data and to the chronic insecurity in South Africa, the non representativeness of our 
sample is explained by the fact that this database was initially created within the framework of 
the African Cities Project (ACP). This last aims at studying the refugees in various cities of 
the African continent
15. But contrary to the other studied cities, the objective in the town of 
Johannesburg was to inquire a given number of migrants (and not a random sample) divided 
into two groups: a group of 600 Somali, Mozambican and Congolese migrants and a group of 
control made up of 200 South-African internal migrants. The investigation was intended to 
support research relating to the phenomena of transit in Southern, Central and East Africa and 
on integration of migrants in the towns of reception in the continent. The countries were thus 
selected not for their potential migratory links but because of their geographical location
16. 
These selection criteria explain why there is no Zimbabwean migrant in the sample whereas 
they are many in South Africa.  
The  migrants  of  the  sample  are  mainly  men  (63.2%)  and  relatively  you ng.  Men  are 
historically more inclined to migrate than women. The main reason is  because they were the 
only ones officially recruited, notably in the mining sector. It appears nevertheless that the 
percentage of migrant women is not negligible (36.6%). 
About five migrants out of ten are between 18 and 30 years old, and four migrants out of ten 
are between 31 and 40. The average age amounts to 31 years old.  The recent arrival of the 
majority of the migrants explains their relatively young character. Nearly six migrants out of 
ten arrived to South Africa less than five years ago, i.e. since 2001. On the other hand, 27.5% 
                                                           
14 Fifteen people are also been excluded because they were interviewed by mistake during the survey. Another 
migrant is been excluded because he remitted within the host country. Lastly in order to have a homogenous 
sample of adults, we chose to drop the international migrant under 18 years old.  
15 That is to say Johannesburg (South Africa), Maputo (capital of Mozambique), Nairobi (capital of Kenya) and 
Lubumbashi (second town of Democratic Republic of Congo after the capital Kinshasa). 
16 Information about the migratory situation and remittances for S outh Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Mozambique and Somalia are presented in annex C.  8 
 
of the migrants have been in South Africa from five to ten years, and 13.8% for more than ten 
years. Thus most migrants (87.17%) arrived to South Africa after 1994, year marking the 
advent of the democracy in this country. 
Table 1: Characteristics of the migrants 
   Total  Remitting migrants 
Congolese (%)  39.44  28.72 
Mozambicans (%)  31.61  35.64 
Somalis (%)  28.95  35.64 
Men(%)  63.22  72.66 
Mean age (years)  31.23  32.35 
Without education (%)  7.28  7.69 
Primary education (%)  20.92  21.33 
Secondary education  (%)  47.39  48.95 
Tertiary education (%)  24.41  22.03 
Married or live together (%)  49.61  44.98 
Number of children   1.66  1.87 
Refugee (%)  48  58.38 
Size of the household in the host country  3.48  3.28 
Mean income of the migrant (rands)  24 858  39 397* 
Median income of the migrant (rands)  18 186  33 774* 
Mean income of the migrant’s household in the host 
country (rands)  47 703  58 626* 
Median income of the migrant’s household in the host 
country (rands)  33 774  49 362* 
Still family in country of origin (%)  94.14  98.27 
Source: MNAC and calculations of the authors  
*This calculation is made by only retaining migrants who remit and have a positive personal income 
or if necessary, who belong to households earning an income in the host country.   
 
Nearly half of the migrants are married or live together (49.6 %), 43.7 % are single and 6.7 % 
are divorced or widowers / widows. Four migrants out of ten do not have children. Among the 
migrants who have children, 73.6% have at least three children, 22.7% have between four and 
seven children and only 3.7% more than seven children. The South African tend to present the 
same features as the fertility rate of South Africa rising on average with 2.6 children per 
woman in 2006
17. On average, the migrants belong to households made up of three to four 
people (migrant included) in the host country
18. In addition, 53% of the migrants result from a 
household of origin including at least another migrant. 
                                                           
17 World Bank 2010:  http://data.worldbank.org/topic/health. 
18 As comparison their household in their country of origin before the migration were composed between 8 and 9 
people on average (migrant included).  9 
 
In terms of educational skills, most migrants are educated, especially the Congolese migrants: 
44% of Congolese migrants achieved at least the tertiary education level against only 10% of 
Mozambicans and 13.5% of Somalis. Only 7.3% of migrants do not have any educational skill 
whereas 20.9% achieved a primary education level, 47.4% achieved the secondary level of 
education, and 24.4% a tertiary level
19. However, and despite their relatively high level of 
education, the majority of migrants do not have any income or earn very little: 24.4% of them 
do not have an income, 27.1% earn less than R500 per week (74 dollars) and 24.9% between 
R500 and R1 500 (between 74 and 222 dollars)
20. On the contrary only 1.4% earn between 
R1 500 and R2 000 per week and 3.2% earn at least R2  000 (295 dollars). On average, the 
annual income of migrants who declare an income came to R24 858
21.  
Another picture emerges when we focus on migrants’ perceptions of their wealth. Despite 
their low income, 65% of migrants think they receive a higher income in South Africa than in 
their country of origin before the migration. Similarly, 89% think they will enjoy better living 
conditions than their parents. And two third of the migrants think that they are as rich as or 
richer than their neighbour in South Africa.  
Concerning the attachment felling to the country of origin, almost all migrants have family in 
the country of origin (93.3%), essentially siblings, parents, cousins, uncles and aunts. This 
objective  familial  link  with  their  country  of  origin  seems  to  be  accompanied  by  a  more 
subjective attachment feeling, as 89% of migrants said they are willing to fight to defend their 
country of origin and 71% said they follow the political affairs of their country.  
Lastly it seems that pull and push factors explain the migration to South Africa
22: 57.5% of 
migrants left their country of origin because of violence, conflic t or persecutions. 18.9% 
chose South Africa as destination country in order to avoid violence and 55.5% to benefit 
from economic or educational opportunities.  
On the whole and at first sight, the migrants of the sample are generally men, rather young, 
arrived recently in South Africa and having a low level of income in spite of their relatively 
high level of education. They are mainly in family with a number of children lower than four. 
Most of them have still family in their country of origin and migrated to flee violence or 
conflict. 
 
                                                           
19 The sums of the percentage are not always equal to 100% because of the people who refused to answer the 
question or who didn’t know.  
20 In 2006 the exchange rate was R1 for USD 0.1477 (Source: FMI).  
21 Migrants’ annual income is calculated on the basis of their weekly income. In the database, weekly income 
was sorted out by class. We used the central value of the class to transform discrete variables into continuous 
variables. We then calculated his/her annual income by multiplying the weekly income by the number of weeks 
in a month (i.e. 4.33) and by the number of months in a year (i.e. 12). Lastly, we did the mean of all individual 
annual incomes to obtain the annual average income of the migrants.   
22 Pull factors are the positive factors of a host country and attract migrants  (e.g. dynamic economy). On the 
other hand, push factors refer to the country of origin of migrants. They are the negative conditions which 
predominate in the country and push people to emigrate (e.g. poverty or unemployment). 10 
 
3.2. Characteristics of the remittances.  
About half of the migrants of the sample have sent money to their country of origin. However 
differences appear according to the sexes: Half of the men (52.4%) of the men against only a 
little more than one third of the women (33.8%). And differences also appear according to the 
legal  status.  49.2%  of  the  “economic”  migrants,  i.e.  who  are  not  defined  as  refugees  or 
asylum-seekers,  already  transferred  money  while  among  the  “forced”  migrants  (refuge  or 
asylum-seekers), the image is more moderate. 52.6% of the migrants who have the official 
status  of  refugees  already  remitted  against  only  34.8%  of  the  asylum-seekers,  who  by 
definition do not have the official status of refugees. 
Transferred amounts tend to be relatively high. 42.9 % of transfers amount to more than R2 
000 whereas only 2 % of transfers do not exceed R199
23. Men tend to transfer higher amounts 
than women (Graphic 1).  
 
Source: MNAC survey and calculations of the authors.  
Migrants seem to have slightly different behaviours according to their origin. It seems that 
Somali migrants transfer higher amounts, i.e. more than R2000 per year, while Congolese 
migrants are more likely to remit between R200 and R799
24. 
On average, migrants transfer R1556 per year, i.e. 4% of their average annual income. When 
considering the average annual income of a household in the host country instead of that of 
the migrant, the part of the remittances amounts to 2.7%
25.   
Migrants tend to remit regularly. 40. 1% of them send money almost every month, whereas 
only 6.6% declare to remit rarely (Graphic 2).  
                                                           
23 Percentages calculations taking into account people who did not want to answer the question.  
24 65% of Somali migrants remit more than R2 000 per year against 36.3% of the Mozambican and 23.8% of the 
Congolese migrants. But 42.9% of Congolese migrants remit between R200 and R799 aga inst 17.6% of 
Mozambican and 14.6% of Somali migrants.  
25 These figures must be interpreted with caution because of the limits of calculation method used to estimate the 
percentage of transfers in migrants’ income (homogenous income hypothesis by class of income, abstraction of 
seasonal volatility etc.).  11 
 
 
Source: MNAC survey 
Migrants remit essentially to their family. A little more than half of migrants remit to their 
parents and siblings still in the country of origin (56.2%). 
To  send  money,  migrants  first  use  informal  channels.  Besides  resorting  to  remittance 
organisations,  they also remit  through their friends  or family members. Few of them use 
commercial banks or other organisations such as Western Union or Money Gram.  
If these statistics give a first idea of the way in which the migrants residing in Johannesburg 
remit, a deeper econometric analysis is necessary to validate or not these results. 
4.  Who are the remitting migrants and how much do they remit?   
The aim is to analyze the role of political and historical variables in the behavior of the 
migrants residing in South Africa as regard remittances. In which measure the end of the 
apartheid and the political conditions in the country of origin before the migration influence 
the transfers independently of the individual characteristics of the migrants?  
Since not all migrants actually remit we cannot use an estimation calculated by Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS). The existence of censored values would lead to biased estimations. The 
Heckman approach (1979) is thus used to correct a potential selection skew of the sample. In 
a first stage the characteristics of the migrants who remit are identified. In a second stage the 
reasons for which the transferred amounts differ from a migrant to another are analyzed. 
4.1. The estimated model. 
The form of the tested equation is the following:  
 
i i i x y    
 
with yi measuring the amounts transferred by the migrant i, 
xi, a vector of individual characteristics including political and historical variables, 
i, the term of errors. 12 
 
As not all the migrants remit the dependant variable is not always observed. The dependant 
variable for the observation i is observed if:  
 
0   
i i z  (selection equation)  
with   ) , 0 (   N   
  ) 1 , 0 ( N    
  corr(,) =  
 
When   0, the estimate of the first regression by the OLS induces skewed results as we 
suppose that the migrants who remit do not constitute a random sample of the whole migrants 
but show specific characteristics. The Heckman approach (1979) then makes it possible to 
obtain estimates asymptotically efficient for all the parameters of such a model.  
 
The  variables  specified  in  the  equation  of  selection  allow  determining  if  the  dependant 
variable (y) is observed. The model estimated is thus:  
 
 
i i i x y    
 
With the assumption that y is observed if  0   
i i z , where  and   have a correlation. 
In other words it means that y is observed if the probability of transferring is positive. 
 
4.2. The results. 
The model 1 (tables 2a and 2b) analyzes the impact of objectives variables linked to the size 
of the household in the host country and to the presence or not of family in the country of 
origin. The traditional objective variables as income, level of education, age, sex, nationality, 
etc. are also taken into account. Furthermore the model explicitly introduces the impact of 
some political variables as the migrant’s condition of leaving (war, conflict, persecutions, 
etc.) and the date of arrival in South Africa (before or after the political change, i.e. the end of 
apartheid).  
The model 2 (tables 2a and 2b) focuses on the effect of subjective variables on the migrant’s 
behavior  as  regard  remittances  by  introducing  his/her  perception  of  income  and  their 
attachment feeling to his/her country of origin. Attachment is approximated by a combination 
of two variables: i) to follow the political affairs of the country of origin and ii) to be willing 
to fight to defend the country of origin.  
As noted by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), results from a large experimental literature by 
and  large  support  economists'  skepticism  regarding  subjective  questions.  Indeed,  in  an 
econometric framework, these findings cast serious doubt on attempts to use subjective data 
as dependent variables, as the measurement error appears to be correlated with a wide array of 
characteristics and behaviors. This would be a rather pessimistic conclusion if limited to those 13 
 
applications which would use this data as dependent variables. However, according to the 
same authors, this data may be useful as explanatory variables. This is the case in the present 
paper where attachment variables, i.e. “to follow political affairs of the country of origin”, “to 
be proud to be a citizen of the country of origin” are used as independent variables.  
 
Table 2a: Transferred amounts corrected from the selection skew (Heckman approach). 
Selection : Remit (Yes/No)  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant  -4.64*** (1.26)  -4.62*** (1.38) 
Country of origin :     
Somalia  0.53** (0.23)  0.70*** (0.25) 
Mozambique   -0.31 (0.27)  -0.36 (0.29) 
DRC  Ref  Ref 
Ln(household’s income)  0.35*** (0.10)  0.28** (0.12) 
Size of the household  -0.5** (0.22)  -0.48* (0.25) 
Age of the migrant :     
       18-31 years old  Ref  Ref 
       31-40 years old  0.44 ***(0.17)  0.48*** (0.18) 
       > 40 years old  -0.07 (0.29)  -0.002 (0.32) 
Man  0.62*** (0.17)  0.76*** (0.19) 
Level of education of the migrant :     
      Without formal education  Ref  Ref 
      Primary education  -0.37 (0.34)  -0.43 (0.42) 
      Secondary education  -0.22 (0.33)  -0.39 (0.40) 
      Tertiary education  -0.36 (0.35)  -0.67 (0.43) 
Arrived in South Africa after 1994  0.52* (0.30)  0.61* (0.32) 
Condition  of  violence  before  the 
migration 
-0.51** (0.20)  -0.35* (0.21) 
Still  family  members  in  country  of 
origin 
1.01*** (0.31)  0.76** (0.36) 
Other migrant in origin household  -0.30* (0.17)  -0.21 (0.18) 
Attachment    -0.17 (0.18) 
Perceptions of the wealth (Yes/No)   
  -  Economic situation of the migrant 
better than this of his/her neighbors 
  0.40** (0.20) 
-  Future  living  conditions  of  the 
migrant better than those of his/her 
parents 
   0.63** (0.27) 
Source: MNAC survey and calculations of the authors. 
Note: Ref = reference variable. 
Threshold of significance: *** 1%, **5%, * 10%. The standard errors are given into brackets.  
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Table 2b: Transferred amounts corrected from the selection skew (Heckman approach). 
Transferred Amounts  Model 1  Model 2 
Constant  -1916.74 (1716.61  -2628.56 (1652.39) 
Country of origin :     
Somalia  535.42*** (150.74)  565.44*** (188.07) 
Mozambique   617.16*** (156.26)  672.95*** (154.83) 
DRC  Ref  Ref 
Ln(household’s income)  262.38*** (99.01)  268.48*** (88.01) 
Size of the household  -263.11* (154.85)  -331.70** (152.89) 
Age of the migrant :     
        18-31 years old  Ref  Ref 
        31-40 years old  -33.44 (127.21)  -46.40 (123.35) 
        > 40 years old  380.26* (197.03)  345.99* (197.49) 
Man  333.98** (161.20)  368.26* (197.95) 
Arrived in South Africa after 1994  120.19 (262.15)  255.54 (264.27) 
Still  family  members  in  country  of 
origin 
233.43 (442.83)  418.86 (390.00) 
Other migrant in the origin household  25.75 (116.25)  12.23 (107.17) 
Attachment    69.71 (121.53) 
Perceptions of the wealth (Yes/No)     
 -    Economic  situation  of  the  migrant 
better than this of his/her neighbors 
  211.15 (147.13) 
 -  Future  living  conditions  of  the 
migrant  better  than  those  of  his/her 
parents 
   27.41 (211.34) 
Selection Ratio  -152.80 (362.18)  18.76 (387.91) 
Number of observations  347  314 
Source: MNAC survey and calculations of the authors. 
Note: Ref = reference variable. 
Threshold of significance: *** 1%, **5%, * 10%. The standard errors are given into brackets.  
 
Contrary  to  Mozambicans,  Somalis  have  a  higher  probability  to  remit  than  Congolese 
migrants (extensive margin) (table 2a). The descriptive statistics show that 56% of Somali 
migrants remit against only 33% of the Congolese. However in terms of transferred amounts 
(intensive margin) Somali and Mozambican migrants remit more than Congolese migrants 
(table 2b). According to Lindley (2007a and 2008) in a country characterized by a strong 
insecurity like Somalia, remittances made by refugees constitute an important mechanism of 
insurance to face the risk of loss of income or the shocks undergone by the family members 
still in Somalia.  15 
 
 
In accordance with the theoretical predictions the probability of transferring and transferred 
amounts increase significantly with the level of income of the migrant.  
 
In the same way and as expected the size of the household in the host country influences 
negatively and significantly the probability of the transfer and the transferred amounts. Given 
the income of the migrant’s household, the larger the household is and less the migrant will be 
willing to remit. A possible explication is that the migrant anticipates future expenditure, 
expenditure of education and health of the children for example, which leads him/her today to 
give up the transfer (extensive margin). Moreover the larger the household of the migrant is in 
the host country, the higher the daily expenditure is and thus the less the migrant can remit 
high amounts (intensive margin). 
 
As the men are mainly heads of household in the sample (73% are primary wage earners 
against  only  30%  of  the  women)  they  have  at  the  same  time  a  stronger  probability  of 
transferring and remit higher amounts than the women.  
 
The  age  variable  presents  differentiated  results.  The  thirty  years  old  migrants  present  a 
probability of sending money abroad stronger than the migrants under 31 years old (and than 
the migrants older than 40 years old). One can think that the thirty years old face heavier 
social constraints than the others. For example the migrants who had to borrow from their 
families to finance their migration and their installation in South Africa have to refund. This 
constraint can be spread out on a relatively long period. The migrants do not refund their 
debts immediately but wait to have an employment and an income. In fact one third of the 
thirty years old have migrated since five to ten years (against 21% which migrated during the 
two last years). The fact that their income is weaker than the income of the forty years old 
(graph 3) doesn’t impact their probability of transferring. On the other hand the migrants old 
of forty and more remit significantly higher amounts because of their higher incomes.  
 
The  following  graphic  represents  the  evolution  of  the  average  income  of  the  migrants 





      Source: MNAC survey and calculations of the authors.  
 
Concerning  the  level  of  education  of  the  migrants,  the  estimates  show  that  the  level  of 
education of the migrants does not affect their probability of transferring. In fact the literature 
on the question is ambiguous. On the one hand and according to the human capital theory, 
educated migrants have a stronger probability of transferring not only because they should 
perceive a higher income but also because they were potentially involved in debt with their 
families  (to  finance  their  education),  or  because  they  have  weaker  probability  of  being 
clandestine and thus present a higher probability to have a bank account for example (Bollard 
and Al, 2009). On the other hand the most educated can be less inclined to remit for several 
reasons. First they can have migrated with their whole household. Second they are likely to 
come from relatively rich households which less needs remittances that an average household. 
Lastly they can be better integrated in the host country and thus they can have relatively 
weaker intention to return in their country than migrants less educated.  
 
As expected, the presence of family members in the country of origin influences positively 
and significantly the probability of the transfer. It is in particular the fact of having children in 
the country of origin that impacts the decision to remit
26. On the other hand the fact of having 
family in the country of origin does not impact the transferred amounts.  
 
The  presence  of  at least  another  migrant  in  the  household  of  origin  has  a  negative  and 
significant effect on the probability of transferring. But it does not have any influence on the 
transferred amounts. The negative impact on the probability of the transfer can be explained 
by the fact that the support for the family does not fall to only one person but is distributed 
between several individuals. Then the implicit obligation to transfer is less strong, which can 
reduce the migrant’s will to remit and consequently the probability of the transfer.  
                                                           
26 The authors carried out another estimate breaking up the family ties with the country of origin and showing 
this result. The estimate presented in this paper (tables 2) understands only the variable “to have family in the 
country of origin”  which is  positive and significant. This aggregate variable  makes it possible to take into 
account all those which have family in the country of origin compared to those which do not have any at all. The 
taking into account of the only variable “To have children” is indeed likely to lead to the confusion of the 
migrants who have family other than the children with those which do not have any at all. 17 
 
 
The traditional variables studied it is  now question to  verify the role of political  context 
variables of the countries of origin and of destination before and after the migration.  
 
According the variable “violent conditions of departure”, the migrants who left their country 
in  violent  conditions  (war,  conflict)  have  a  weaker  probability  of  transferring
27. Several 
assumptions of interpretation can be advanced. First the migrants who left their country in 
such a context can be seem as “forced migrants” or refugees who are likely to break the 
emotional links they have with their country of origin. Furthermore even if family ties are 
controlled this weaker probability can also be explained by the potential loss of very close 
relatives during the conflict in the country of origin, which would result in breaking the link 
with the family maintained through remittances (Lindley, 2008). Lastly, the fact of stating to 
have family in the country of origin does not mean that the migrants did not lose the physical 
contact with the family members still in their country. Young (2006) shows that the means of 
communication  were  disturbed  and  that  it  could  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  the 
migrants to locate their moved family after the crisis of 2003 in Darfur. 
 
The second political variable relates to the regime change in South Africa. The migrants who 
arrived  after  1994  in  a  post  apartheid  context  have  a  significant  higher  probability  of 
transferring. This can be explained by the fact that the opening of the country enhanced its  
attractiveness  to the potential migrants (growth recovery in the Nineties, accession of South 
Africa  with  the  SADC  (Southern  Africa  Development  Community)  in  1994)  and  larger 
possibilities of mobility of goods and people, which support the behavior of transfer (Maharaj, 
2004; Crush and Williams, 2010). 
 
Consequently and based on the above, the political context in the country of origin before the 
migration and in the host country after the migrant’s installation is determining. The migrants 
with a greater probability of transferring are also those that arrived in South Africa after the 
apartheid  regime  and that did  not  emigrate because of political  and/or ethnic violence or 
conflict in their country of origin. On the other hand, the analysis of the marginal effects 
shows that the positive effect of being arrived in South Africa after 1994 on the probability of 
remitting is perfectly compensated by the negative effect of having fled the country of origin 
because of violence.  
To complete this analysis it is necessary to introduce the role of subjective variables, i.e. the 
attachment of the migrants to their country of origin and their perception of their wealth, in 
the decision to remit. The attachment is approximated by the fact of following the political 
affairs of the country of origin and being ready to fight to defend the country of origin.  
The income of the migrants is also measured by subjective variables. Perceptions of wealth 
are also used. The facts that the migrants think they are richer than their neighbors in the host 
                                                           
27 We use the variable “violence” only in the probability of the transfer because we can think that once the 
decision of remitting is taken, it is more the current situation in the country of origin (capture by the dummy 
country of origin) than the conditions of leaving that influence the transferred amounts.  18 
 
country and/or that they will have better living conditions than their parents are introduced in 
the model.  It  is  a way  to  study the impact  of  the relative wealth of the migrants  on the 
probability of transferring and on the transferred amounts.   
Results are presented in the model 2, tables 2a and 2b. The variable of attachment is neither 
significant with regards to the probability of transferring nor to the transferred amounts. In the 
context of migration from unstable countries and countries inclined to violence, answers to 
questions  aimed  at  gauging  attachment  indicate  cognitive  dissonance  and  suggest  that 
attachment is not a discriminating variable. Indeed, 89% of the surveyed individuals say that 
they are willing to fight to defend their country of origin, 71% that they follow the political 
affairs of their country and 63% of the migrants follow the political affairs of their country 
and are willing to fight to defend it. These rates are high while more than half of the migrants 
left their country because of violence and conflict. The variable used as proxy of attachment 
concerns two thirds of the sample and thus, unlike political variables, doesn’t discriminate the 
behavior of the migrants as regard remittances.  
Concerning  the  migrant’s  income,  the  objective  variable  (logarithm  of  the  income  of  the 
household of the migrant) is positive and significant in both models. Two subjective variables 
are added. They allow capturing the feeling of the migrants relating to their standard of living 
and  to  their  relative  wealth.  Only  the  variable  relating  to  the  perception  of  the  migrants 
concerning their living conditions compared to these of their parents impacts significantly and 
positively  the  probability  of  the  transfer.  Controlling  for  income,  the  more  the  migrants 
anticipate better living conditions compared to their parents, the higher their probability of 
transferring.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  of  feeling  richer  than  the  neighbors  in  the  host 
country doesn’t have any influence on the probability of transferring. A potential explanation 
is that the probability of the transfer depends more on the family’s needs in the country of 
origin than on the feeling of relative wealth of the migrants in the host country. The migrants 
can thus decide to remit even if they don’t feel richer than their neighbors in the host country 
but because they think that they will have better living conditions than their parents. This 
result seems to validate theoretical approaches positing altruistic motives
28. Lastly, none of 
these variables of perception influence the transferred amounts. 
To sum up  the  thirty years old  migrants,  in particular the Somalis   males,  members  of 
households of reduced size, with high income and which have family ties in their country of 
origin are more inclined to remit. Among those who transfer, the Somali and Mozambican 
migrants older than 40 years and whose income is relatively higher remit more important 
amounts.  Moreover the  political change  in  South Africa  has  a  positive  influence  on  the 
probability  of transferring  (but  not  on  the  transferred  amounts).  On the other hand, the 
existence of violence or conflicts in the country of origin before the migration reduces the 
                                                           
28 To completely test the altruistic reason as determinant of remittances, it is necessary to have the income of the 
recipient family in the country of origin. It is not the case here. However the tested variable is of subjective 
nature in terms of migrant’s level of wealth perception compared to this of his/her family in the country of 
origin.  19 
 
probability of the transfer. These results can be considered as robust because most of the 
variables remain significant in both models.  
5.  Conclusion. 
In this paper the emphasis is put on the impact of political variables on remittances in the case 
on South-South migrations. The use of an original survey conducted in South Africa and 
relating to African migrants (Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mozambique) residing 
in Johannesburg makes it possible to highlight the positive impact of the regime change in 
South Africa (end of the apartheid) on the probability of the transfer. On the side of the origin 
countries of the migrants, the result shows that political instability at the time of the departure 
impacts negatively and significantly the probability of transferring of the migrants. The fact of 
having left its country for reasons of violence or conflicts results in a negative relation to the 
country of origin in terms of remittances. The fact of having migrated because of violence 
expresses  in  reality  the  refugee  status  of  the  migrant  or  the  forced  characteristic  of  the 
migration. On the other hand, voluntary departures can integrate the objective to remit.  
However the political variables don’t impact the transferred amounts. They influence the type 
of relation that the migrants  have with  their country  of origin through the probability of 
transferring or not. But since the migrants decided to remit, transferred amounts will be more 
determined by the traditional objective factors: income, education, duration of stay…. 
Among the migrants who remit and compared to the Congolese migrants, Somalis have the 
highest probability of transferring. The income of the migrants and the perception of a higher 
level of wealth compared  to his/her parents in the country of origin explain this Refugees and 
asylum seekers don’t face the same environment than economic and legal migrants in the host 
country with differential consequences on their remittance behavior.  A deeper analysis of the 
impact  of  the  laws  on  the  status  of  migrants  in  the  host  country  is  needed  for  a  fuller 
understanding of migrants’ remittance behavior.  
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7.  Annexes.  
Annex A: Table connecting the dependant variables to the questions of the survey. 
 
Variable  Question  
Somalia 




    Size of the household 
in the host country 
 
"Including yourself, how many people are part of your household? 
When I say household, I mean people with whom you live and 
regularly share ressources" 
    Household's income in 
the host country 
"Approximately how much money does your household earn per week 
from all sources of income combined?" 
    Sex  "Respondent's sex" 
    Level of education  "What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?" 
    Age  "How old are you?" 
    Household's member 
still in country of 
origin 
"Are there still members of your household from country of origin 
living in your country of origin?" 
 
    Date of arrival  "What year did you first arrive in South Africa?" 
    Condition of the 
departure 
"Why did you ultimately decide to leave country/community of 
origin?" 
    Other migrant in the 
household of country 
of origin 
"Are there members of your household from country of origin living in 
a country other than country of origin or South Africa?" 
 
    Following the political 
affairs of the country 
of origin 
How often do you follow political affair in South Africa? Would you 
say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?” 
 
    To be willing to fight 
to defend the country 
of origin 
"Would you fight to defend your Country of Origin/Community of 
Origin?" 
 
    Relative wealth in the 
host country 
 
"Compared with others in the area where you live, would you say your 
household is poorer than average, about average, better than average or 
you don't know?" 
    Future living 
conditions compared 
with the parents 
"Generally speaking, do you think that your life will be better or worse 
than you parent's lives?" 
 





Annex B: Presentation of the variables used in the models. 
Variable  Signification  Description 
Somalia 
 





Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant is a 
Somali, 0 otherwise 
Mozambique 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant is a 




Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant is a 
Congolese, 0 otherwise (reference 
variable) 
      Size of the household 
in the host country 
 
Size of the household of the 
migrant in the host country 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant lives with 
other people in his/her household in South 
Africa,  0 otherwise 
      Household's income 
in the host country 
 
Annual income of the 
household of the migrant in 
log  Continuous variable 
      Sex 
 
Sex of the migrant 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant is a man, 
0 otherwise 
     
No formal education 
 






Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant doesn’t 




Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant finish a 
primary level of education, 0 otherwise 
Secondary education 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant finish a 
secondary level of education, 0 otherwise 
Tertiary education 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant finish a 
tertiary level of education, 0 otherwise 
      18-30 years old 
 





Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant has 
between 18 and 30 years old, 0 otherwise 
(category of reference) 
31-40 years old 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant has 
between 31 and 40 years old, 0 otherwise 
More than 40 years 
old 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant has more 
than 40 years old, 0 otherwise 
      Still familly members 
in the country of 
origin 
Still family members in the 
country of origin 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant still has 
family in his/her country of origin, 0 
otherwise 
      Date of arrival 
 
Date of arrival in the host 
country 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant arrived in 
Johannesburg after1994, 0 otherwise 
      Conditions of 
departure 
 
Having left its country of 
origin for reason of violence, 
war, conflict, discrination,etc. 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant fled 
his/her country because of violence, war, 
conflict, etc., 0 otherwise 
      Other migrant in the 
household of origin 
 
The migrant belongs to an 
household of origin where 
there is at least another 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant belongs 
to an origin household where there is at 
least another migrant,0 otherwise 24 
 





To follow the political affairs 
of the country of origin and to 
be willing to fight to defend it 
 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant follows 
the political affairs of his/her country of 
origin and if he/she is willing to fight to 
defend it, 0 otherwise 
      Relative wealth in the 
host country 
  Perception of the level of   
wealth of the migrant 
 
 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant thinks to 
be richer than his/her neighbors in the host 
country, 0 otherwise 
Future living 
conditions compared 
to the parents 
Dummy equal to 1 if the migrant thinks 
that he/she will have better living 
conditions than his/her parents, 0 otherwise 
Source: MNAC survey and calculations of the authors. 
 
Annex C: Migratory situation and remittances in South Africa, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Mozambique and Somalia. 
Source: World Bank, 2010  
      South Africa  DRC  Mozambique  Somalia 
Population  million (2009)  49.3  66  22.9  9.1 
PIB  curent USD (billion) (2009)  286  10.8  9.8  n.a 
Stock of immigrants  thousand (2010)  1,862.9  444.7  450  22.8 
       Part of the population  percentage (2010)  3.7  0.7  1.9  0.2 
       Refugees   percentage (2010)  1.9  43.4  0.6  3.4 
       Women  percentage (2010)  42.7  53.1  52.1  45.9 
Stock of emigrants  thousand (2010)  878.1  913.9  1,178.5  812.7 
       Part of the population  percentage (2010)  1.7  1.3  5  8.7 
Inward remittance flows  curent USD (billion) (2010)  1  n.a  0.117  n.a 
Outward remittance flows  curent USD (billion) (2009)  1,158  n.a  0.063  n.a 
8.  Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo 
 